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Abstract
In this paper we argue that government procurement policy played a role in stimulating
the wave of innovation that hit the US economy in the 1980￿ s, as well as the simultaneous
increase in inequality and in education attainment. Since the early 1980￿ s U.S. policy
makers began targeting commercial innovations more directly and explicitly. We focus
on the shift in the composition of public demand towards high-tech goods which, by
increasing the market-size of innovative ￿rms, functions as a de-facto innovation policy
tool. We build a quality-ladders non-scale growth model with heterogeneous industries
and endogenous supply of skills, and show both theoretically and empirically that increases
in the technological content of public spending stimulates R&D, raises the wage of skilled
workers and, at the same time, stimulates human capital accumulation. A calibrated
version of the model suggests that government policy explains up to 32 percent of the
observed increase in wage inequality in the period 1978-91.
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In the early 1980s we observe a substantial increase of public investment in high-tech sectors
in the U.S.: investment in equipment and software (E&S), which was 20 percent of total
government investment in 1980, climbs to about 40 percent in 1990 and to more than 50
percent in 2001.1 The composition of private investment also switched towards E&S but more
than a decade later, catching up with the public trend in the 1990s (NSF 2002). Accompanying
this acceleration of the technological intensity of public spending we observe an 18 percent
increase in the relative wage of skilled workers during the 1980s (CPS 1999).
In this paper we argue that the change in the composition of public spending reallocated
market-size from low-tech to high-tech industries, thus enlarging the market for more innovative
products and stimulating innovation. As innovation is a skill-using activity, government policy
may have also helped to stimulate the relative demand for skills and raise the skill-premium.
Our analysis remarks that although government procurement is not an explicit policy tool, it
has often worked as ‘de facto’ innovation policy instrument.
We build a version of the quality-ladder growth model with endogenous supply of skills
(Dinopoulos and Segerstrom 1999). A new and key feature of our model is the introduction of
heterogeneous industries. The economy is populated by a continuum of monopolistic compet-
itive industries with asymmetric innovation power; in the language of quality-ladders models
this implies that each sector has a diﬀerent quality-jump any time an innovation arrives. In this
setting we introduce government policy, in the form of a public spending rule: the government
can allocate its expenditure in manufactured goods using a continuum of diﬀerent policy rules,
from the extreme symmetric rule, where each sector gets the same share of public spending, to
an asymmetric rule, meaning that the sector with the highest quality jump receives the greatest
amount of government spending.
In our model, high-tech sectors are those where innovation brings technological improve-
ments, quality jumps, that are greater than average. There are two activities in the economy:
manufacturing, carried out by a continuum of asymmetric ﬁrms, and innovation activity or pro-
duction of ideas. We assume that unskilled labor is used exclusively in manufacturing and that
ideas are produced using only skilled labor. As the government reallocates spending from low
1E&S includes a group of investment goods that are considered more innovative than those included in
structures (see Cummins and Violante 2002 and Hobjin 2001b).
1to high-tech sectors, aggregate proﬁts increase. Intuitively, higher quality jumps in high-tech
sectors imply higher mark-ups and larger proﬁts. Hence, a redistribution of public spending in
favor of these sectors raises aggregate proﬁts in the economy. In quality-ladder growth mod-
els monopoly proﬁt sa r et h er e w a r d sf o ri n n o v a t i o na c t i v i t i e s ,s ot h ei n c r e a s ei nt o t a lp r o ﬁts
produced by the reshuﬄing of public spending will raise the relative demand for skilled workers.
Finally, there is a training choice in the model that endogenizes skills formation. This
implies that, by increasing the skill premium, high-tech public spending will also raise the
incentives to train and accumulate skills. Therefore, wage inequality generated by our source
of technical change will be a general equilibrium result, where both the supply and the demand
for skills are endogenous.
We adopt a broad interpretation of innovation in order to include all of those activities that
are targeted to increase ﬁrm proﬁts. In our model, workers performing innovative activities
are those workers that, with their intellectual skills, contribute to give a ﬁrm a competitive
advantage over others. Therefore, we do not restrict our view to R&D activities. While R&D
workers play an important role in innovation, they are not the only skilled workforce that a
ﬁrm needs to beat its rivals: managerial and organizational activities, marketing, legal and
ﬁnancial services are all widely and increasingly used by modern corporations to compete in
the marketplace.
This paper is related to the literature on skill-biased technical change (SBTC).2 Like other
works in this area, we focus on the role of technical change in aﬀecting the U.S. wage struc-
ture in recent decades. In our paper, innovation is skill-biased by assumption, as in models
of exogenous SBTC (i.e. Aghion, Howitt, Violante 2002, Caselli 1999, Galor and Moav 2000,
Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, Violante 2000), but technical change is endogenous, as in models
of endogenous SBTC (Acemoglu 1998 and 2002b, Kiley 1998).3 We share with endogenous
technology models the idea that innovation is proﬁt-driven and that market-size is one key de-
terminant of proﬁtability. Like endogenous SBTC models, we explore the ‘sources’ of technical
change, but while these works focus on the market-size eﬀect produced by an increase in the
relative supply of skills, in our paper the source of the market-size eﬀect is government spend-
ing. Moreover, strictly speaking, our model is not a model of SBTC in the sense that innovation
2For a review of this literature see Acemoglu (2002), Aghion (2002) and Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante
(2005).
3Galor and Moav (2000) in section IV introduce endogenous technical change through human capital accu-
mulation.
2does not increase the productivity of skilled workers. In our framework, as in Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom (1999), innovation is simply a skill-intensive activity, and wage inequality increases
w i t ht h es i z eo ft h i sa c t i v i t y .
Our paper is related to Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) version of the quality-ladder
growth model. With respect to that work our contribution is the following: ﬁrst, on the theory
side, the presence of asymmetric industries allows government spending to aﬀect innovation
and the skill premium. This is not obtainable by simply introducing government spending into
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom’s symmetric framework. Second, while their application focuses on
trade liberalization as the source of technical change and wage inequality, we examine the role
of government policy. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to assess the relevance of the
public ‘policy channel’ in the debate on technical change and wage inequality in the U.S.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the stylized facts on government policy
and wage inequality. Section 3 sets up the model. Sections 4 and 5 derive the main results
and explain the intuition for the macroeconomic consequences of asymmetric steady states.
In section 6 we calibrate the model to match salient long-run facts of the U.S. economy and
perform a quantitative evaluation of our theoretical mechanism. Section 7 provides remarks on
the qualitative and quantitative predictions of the model. Section 8 concludes.
2S t y l i z e d f a c t s
In this section we provide some background evidence on the dynamics of public spending
composition and wage inequality in recent decades. Although government procurement has
never been an explicit policy tool, it has always worked as a de facto relevant innovation
policy instrument. David Hart presents the argument in the following way: “[Public] R&D
spending was typically accompanied by other measures that deserve at least as much credit for
their technological payoﬀs. For instance, the Department of Defense (DOD) not only funded
much of the physical science and engineering R&D that led to advances in semiconductors
and computers, it also purchased a large fraction of products themselves, especially the most
advanced products. The DOD guaranteed that a market for electronics would exist, inducing
private investment on a scale that would not have otherwise followed even the most promising
research results” (Hart 1998 p.1). Hence, according to this view, public procurement guaranteed
am a r k e tt oi n n o v a t i v eﬁrms, especially in early stages of product development. There is
3evidence that the DOD, NASA and also other government agencies, such as the Department of
Health, contributed to private innovation via demand-pull (see Ruttan 2003, and Finkelstein
2003).
In this paper we propose an aggregate measure of this demand-pull channel for innovation.
We use BEA NIPA data that breaks-up public investment between E&S and structures. E&S
includes a group of investment goods that are considered more innovative than those included
in structures, so we choose E&S as our high-tech aggregate. The focus on investment is due
to the fact that there is no aggregate data keeping track of the technological composition of
public consumption expenditures.
In ﬁgure 1 we report the evolution of the skill premium and of the composition of gov-
ernment investment spending, expressed as the ratio of government investment in E&S over
total government investment. The relevant fact here is that both series jump from a fairly
steady course to a rapidly increasing one during the late 1970s early 1980s. This common
and contemporaneous trend change suggests that the shift towards high-tech public spending,
which began around 1974 and radically accelerated around 1978, might have had an inﬂuence
on rising inequality in the 1980s.4
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Using the same data we ﬁnd that also the composition of private investment progressively
shifted towards E&S since the late 1970s. However, the technological composition of public
investment accelerated in the 1980s -the period when wage inequality increased more rapidly-
while the rise of private investment in E&S was concentrated in the 1990s. More precisely, the
yearly average growth rate of private investment was 9 percent while the growth rate of public
investment was 16 percent in the period 1970-90; while private spending jumped on those high
growth rates only in the 1990s.5
As R&D represents an important part of innovation activity, ﬁgure 2 shows that, as was
the case for the composition of public spending, the trend of private R&D/GDP also increases
substantially in the late 1970s, along with that of the skill premium.6
4We are not interested in explaining the decline in the skill premium observed in the 1970s. For this reason
the weaker correlation between the two series in the 1970s does not aﬀect our argument.
5We also ﬁnd that the ratio of public to private investment in the innovative aggregate has been betwen 13
and 26 percent in the period 1970-90. This indicates that the scale of public E&S is not negligible in the period
of interest.
6The technological composition of government procurement aﬀects the market-size of all kinds of innovation
activities, of which R&D is a relevant component.
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Next, we explore more in detail the properties of the data. We perform a preliminary
econometric analysis to test the correlation between the variables of interest. We would like to
emphasize that our goal here is not to establish causality but only to show some key correlations
that motivate our analysis. The calibration exercise in section 6 will provide a structural
evaluation of the quantitative eﬀect of public spending on wage inequality.
We consider only one dimension of innovation activities, R&D investment, and look for a
positive correlation between government spending, innovation and the skill premium. First, we
regress private investment in R&D, as a share of GDP, to the composition of public spending
for the period 1953-2001.
TABLE I
Public spending composition and R&D investment
dependent variable: R&D/GDP
regressors: coeﬀ prob
GE&S/GI 0.295992 0.0487
R&D/GDP(-1) 0.951597 0.0000
n. of obs. adjusted 55
R-squared 0.98449
Adjusted R-squared 0.984111
Breusch-Godfrey LM F stat 1.051945 prob =0 .407103
Breusch-Godfrey LM Obs*R-squared 6.511739 prob =0 .368366
Source: BEA, Nipa tables sections 5 and 7.
We ﬁnd that private R&D is positively correlated with public investment in E&S as a share of
total public investment.7
We also look at what the data say about the relationship between non-federal R&D expen-
diture and the skill premium. Here we have shorter time series, 1963-1999, due to skill premium
data availability, but the results are good, as shown in the following table II below.8 We ﬁnd
7The constant is not displayed in table I because it was not signiﬁcant even at 10%. Some comments on
some of the standard diagnostic tests we performed are necessary. First, the Ljung-Box Q test rejects the null
hypothesis of residuals autocorrelation. We also performed the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier tests and
we were able to reject the null hypothesis of serial autocorrelation at all lags - the one showed in table I is for
four lags. Second, both explanatory variables, when subjected to an Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test do
not prove stationary. Therefore, we performed the ADF test on the regression residuals: the test statistics is
equal to −5.6633, which also passes the stricter Engle and Yoo (1987) version of the unit root test. Hence, the
regression results can be considered fairly reliable.
8Here again we deal with two non-stationary series, so the basic reliability of the regression is obtained
running the same battery of tests that we discussed in the previous footnote. The Q and the LM-tests rejects
serial autocorrelation of residuals, and statistics of the ADF test on residuals in this case is −5.5058.T h i s
allows us to consider the regression results suﬃciently accurate.
5and positive and signiﬁcative correlation between investment in R&D and the skill premium.
TABLE II
R&D investment and skill premium
dependent variable: skill premium
regressors: coeﬀ prob
R&D/GDP 0.047074 0.0388
skill premium(-1) 0.961224 0.0000
n. of obs. adjusted 36
R-squared 0.914528
Adjusted R-squared 0.912015
Breusch-Godfrey LM F stat 1.213211 prob =0 .325839
Breusch-Godfrey LM Obs*R-squared 5.003754 prob =0 .286913
Source: BEA, Nipa tables sections 5 and 7.
The results in table II are qualitatively in line with those of more extensive and speciﬁc empirical
studies. For instance Machin and Van Reenen (1998), using industry-speciﬁc R&D intensity
as an indicator of technology, ﬁnd a strong correlation between technical change and skill
upgrading in the U.S. in the 1980s. More precisely, they ﬁnd that both R&D intensity and
the wage share of non-production workers grew in the 1980s, and that R&D intensity is a
signiﬁcative regressor for the wage and employment share of non-production workers in all
manufacturing sectors. In addition to this they also show that while skill-upgrading is observed
within all industries, it appears to be more intense in high-tech sectors.
We can now wonder how the two correlations showed above concur in a unique indirect
correlation between public investment composition and the skill premium. This is assessed by
directly regressing the skill premium to the composition of public spending, as reported in the
next regression table III.9 Again we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcative correlation.
9As with the previous two regressions the Q and LM-tests allowed us to reject serial correlation of residuals
at all lags. The ADF statistics was −5.8179, which again passes also the stricter Engle and Yoo test.
6TABLE III
Public spending composition and skill premium
dependent variable: skill premium
regressors: coeﬀ prob
GE&S/GI 0.137137 0.0388
skill premium(-1) 0.976489 0.0000
n. of obs. adjusted 36
R-squared 0.917077
Adjusted R-squared 0.914638
Breusch-Godfrey LM F stat 1.373256 prob =0 .266687
Breusch-Godfrey LM Obs*R-squared 5.562143 prob =0 .234321
Source: BEA, Nipa tables sections 5 and 7.
In our opinion this set of facts and preliminary evidence provide a suﬃcient motivation to
dig deeper into the links between public spending composition, technology, and wage inequality.
3T h e m o d e l
3.1 Households
Households diﬀer in their members’ ability to become skilled workers, and the ability, θ,i s
uniformly distributed over the unit interval. Households have identical intertemporally addi-
tively separable and unit elastic preferences for an inﬁnite set of consumption goods indexed
by ω ∈ [0,1], and each is endowed with a unit of labor/study time whose supply generates no
disutility. Households choose their optimal consumption bundle for each date by solving the
following optimization problem:
max
Z ∞
0
N0e
−(ρ−n)t loguθ(t)dt (1)
subject to
loguθ(t) ≡
Z 1
0
log
⎡
⎣
jmax(ω,t) X
j=0
λ
j
ωqθ(j,ω,t)
⎤
⎦dω
cθ(t) ≡
Z 1
0
⎡
⎣
jmax(ω,t) X
j=0
p(j,ω,t)qθ(j,ω,t)
⎤
⎦dω
Wθ(0) + Zθ(0) −
Z ∞
0
N0e
−
U t
0(r(τ)−n)dτTdt=
Z ∞
0
N0e
−
U t
0(r(τ)−n)dτcθ(s)dt
where N0 is the initial population and n i si t sc o n s t a n tg r o w t hr a t e ,ρ is the common rate of
time preference, with ρ>nand where r(t) is the market interest rate. qθ(j,ω,t) is the per-
member ﬂow of good ω ∈ [0,1] of quality j ∈ {0,1,2,...} purchased by a household of ability
7θ ∈ (0,1) at time t ≥ 0. p(j,ω,t) is the price of good ω of quality j at time t, cθ(t) is nominal
expenditure, and Wθ(0) and Zθ(0) are human and non-human wealth levels. A new vintage of
a good ω yields a quality equal to λω times the quality of the previous vintage, with λω > 1.
Diﬀerent versions of the same good ω are regarded by consumers as perfect substitutes after
adjusting for their quality ratios, and jmax(ω,t) denotes the maximum quality in which good ω
is available at time t. As is common in quality ladders models, we assume price competition10
at all dates, which implies that in equilibrium only the top quality product is produced and
consumed in positive amounts. T is a per-capita lump-sum tax.
The instantaneous utility function has unitary elasticity of substitution, implying that goods
are perfect substitutes, once you account for quality. Thus, households maximize static utility
by spreading their expenditures evenly across the product line and by purchasing in each
line only the product with the lowest price per unit of quality, that is the product of quality
j = jmax(ω,t). Hence, the household’s demand of each product is:
qθ(j,ω,t)=
cθ(t)
p(j,ω,t)
for j = j
max(ω,t) and is zero otherwise (2)
The presence of a lump sum tax does not change the standard Euler equation:
.
cθ
cθ
= r(t) − ρ (3)
Individuals are ﬁnitely-lived members of inﬁnitely-lived households, being continuously born
at rate β and dying at rate δ,w i t hβ − δ = n>0; D>0 denotes the exogenous duration
of their life11. People are altruistic in that they care about their household’s total discounted
utility according to the intertemporally additive functional shown in (1). They choose to train
and become skilled, if at all, at the beginning of their lives, and the (positive) duration of their
training period, during which the individual cannot work, is set at T<D .
Hence an individual with ability θ decides to train if and only if:
Z t+D
t
e
−
U s
t r(τ)wL(s)ds <
Z t+D
t+Tr
e
−
U s
t r(τ) max(θ − γ,0)wH(s)ds,
with 0 <γ<1/2. The ability parameter is deﬁned so that a person with ability θ>γis able
10All qualitative results maintain their validity under the opposite assumption of quantity competition.
11As in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999, p.454) it is easy to show that the above parameters cannot be
chosen independently, but that they must satisfy δ = n
enD−1 and β = nenD
enD−1 in order for the number of births
at time t to match the number of deaths at t + D.
8to accumulate skills (human capital) θ−γ after training, while a person with ability below this
cut-oﬀ gains no human capital from training.
We will focus on the steady state analysis, in which all variables grow at constant rates
and where wL, wH,a n dcθ are all constant. It follows that r(t)=ρ at all dates, and that the
individual will train if and only if her ability is higher than
θ0 =
£¡
1 − e
−ρD¢
/
¡
e
−ρTr − e
−ρD¢¤ wL
wH
+ γ ≡ σ
wL
wH
+ γ.( 4 )
The supply of unskilled labor at time t is:
L(t) ≡ θ0N(t)=
µ
σ
wL
wH
+ γ
¶
N(t). (5)
We set wL =1 , so that the unskilled wage becomes our numeraire. Following the same steps
as Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999), the reader can easily verify that the supply of skilled
labor at time s is:
H(t)=( θ0 +1− 2γ)(1− θ0)φN(t)/2,( 6 )
with 0 <φ=
¡
en(D−TR) − 1
¢
/
¡
enD − 1
¢
< 1. In steady state the growth rate of L(t) and H(t)
is equal to n.
3.2 Manufacturing
Firms can hire unskilled workers to produce any consumption good ω ∈ [0,1] of the second
best quality under a constant returns to scale (CRS) technology with one worker producing
one unit of product. However, in each industry the top-quality product can be manufactured
only by the ﬁrm that has discovered it, whose rights are protected by a perfectly enforceable
patent law.
As usual in Schumpeterian models with vertical innovation (see e.g. Grossman and Helpman,
1991, and Aghion and Howitt, 1992) the next best-quality of a given good is invented by means
of innovation activity performed by challenger ﬁrms in order to earn monopoly proﬁts that will
be destroyed by the next innovator. During each temporary monopoly the patentholder can
sell the product at prices higher than the unit cost. We assume that the patent expires when
further innovation occurs in the industry. Hence monopolist rents are destroyed not only by
obsolescence but also because a competitive fringe can copy the product using the same CRS
technology.
9The unit elastic demand structure12 encourages the monopolist to set the highest possible
price to maximize proﬁts, but the existence of a competitive fringe sets a ceiling to it equal to
the lowest unit cost of the previous quality product. This allows us to conclude that the price
p(jmax(ω,t),ω,t) of every top quality good is:
p(j
max(ω,t),ω,t)=λω,f o ra l lω ∈ [0,1] and t ≥ 0.( 7 )
Our ﬁscal policy tool will be sector speciﬁc per-capita public spending Gω(t) ≥ 0, for all
ω ∈ [0,1] and t ≥ 0. The government uses tax revenues to ﬁnance public spending in diﬀerent
sectors and we assume that the government budget is balanced at every date: N(t)T(t)=
N(t)
R 1
0 Gω(t)dω . Moreover, we will assume N(t)T(t) <γ N (t)/a, i.e. T(t) <γ / a ,i no r d e r
to guarantee that public expenditure is feasible. Since we are interested in steady states, in
which per-capita variables are constant, from now on we will drop time indexes from per-capita
taxation and per-capita expenditures.
From the static consumer demand (2) we can immediately conclude that the demand for
each product ω is:
N(t)
R 1
0 cθdθ
λω
+
N(t)Gω
λω
≡
cN(t)
λω
+
N(t)Gω
λω
= qω,( 8 )
where c =
R 1
0 cθdθ is average per-capita consumption. Sectorial market-clearing conditions
imply that demand equals production of every consumption good by the ﬁrm that monopolizes
it, qω. It follows that the stream of proﬁts accruing to the monopolist which produces a state-
of-the-art quality product will be equal to:
π(ω,t)=qω (λω − 1) = (cN(t)+GωN(t))
µ
1 −
1
λω
¶
.( 9 )
Hence a ﬁrm that produces good ω has an expected discounted value that satisﬁes
v(ω,t)=
πω
ρ + I(ω,t) −
.
v(ω,t)
v(ω,t)
=
qω (λω − 1)
ρ + I(ω,t) −
.
v(ω,t)
v(ω,t)
,
where I(ω,t) denotes the worldwide Poisson arrival rate of an innovation that will destroy the
monopolist’s proﬁts in industry ω. In a steady state where per-capita variables all grow at the
same rate, it is easy to prove that
.
v(ω,t)
v(ω,t) = n. Hence the expected value of a ﬁrm becomes
v(ω,t)=
qω (λω − 1)
ρ + I(ω,t) − n
.( 1 0 )
12Any CES utility index with elasticity of substitution not greater than one would imply this result.
103.3 Innovation races
In each industry leaders are challenged by the innovation activity of followers that employ skilled
workers and produce a probability intensity of inventing the next version of their products. The
arrival rate of innovation in industry ω at time t is I(ω,t), and it is the aggregate summation
of the Poisson arrival rate of innovation produced by all R&D ﬁrms targeting product ω.
In each sector new ideas are introduced according to a Poisson arrival rate of innovation
by use of a CRS technology characterized by the unit cost function bwHX(ω,t),w i t hb>0
common in all industries, and X(ω,t) > 0 measuring the diﬃculty of innovation in industry ω.
Hence the production of ideas is formally equivalent to buying a lottery ticket that confers to
its owner the exclusive right to the corresponding innovation proﬁts, with the aggregate rate of
innovation proportional to the “number of tickets” purchased. The Poisson speciﬁcation of the
innovative process implies that the individual contribution to innovation by each skilled labor
unit gives an independent (additive) contribution to the aggregate instantaneous probability
of innovation: hence innovation productivity is the same if each skilled worker undertakes her
activity by working alone as when she works with others in large ﬁrms.
The technological complexity index X(ω,t) has been introduced into endogenous growth the-
ory after Charles Jones’ (1995) empirical criticism of R&D based growth models that generate
scale eﬀects in the steady state per-capita growth rate. According to Segerstrom’s (1998) inter-
pretation of Jones’ (1995) solution to the “strong scale eﬀect” problem (Jones 2005), X(ω,t) is
increasing in the accumulated stock of eﬀective innovation:
.
X(ω,t)
X(ω,t)
= μI(ω,t),( T E G )
with positive μ, thus formalizing the idea that early discoveries ﬁsh out the easier inventions
ﬁrst, leaving the most diﬃcult ones for the future. This formulation implies that increasing
diﬃculty of innovation causes per-capita GDP growth to vanish over time unless an ever-
increasing share of resources are invested in innovation, thereby requiring a growing educated
population.13 In the present framework with quality-improving consumer’s goods “growth” is
interpreted as the increase of the representative consumer utility level over time.
13The acronym “TEG” refers to the “temporary eﬀects on growth” of policy measures such as innovation
subsidies and tariﬀs: they cannot alter the steady state per-capita growth rate, which is instead pinned down by
the population growth rate. For this reason these type of frameworks are also called “semi-endogenous” growth
models.
11For industries targeted by innovation the constant returns to innovation activity and free
entry and exit imply the no-arbitrage condition
v(ω,t) ≡
qω (λω − 1)
ρ + I(ω,t) − n
= bwHX(ω,t).( 1 1 )
The usual Arrow or replacement eﬀect (Aghion and Howitt 1992) implies that the monopolist
does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to undertake any innovation activity at the equilibrium wage.
4 Balanced growth paths
We are now in a position to analyze the general equilibrium implications of the previous setting.
Since each ﬁnal good monopolist employs unskilled labor to manufacture each commodity, the
unskilled labor market equilibrium is
N(t)θ0 =
Z 1
0
qωdω =
Z 1
0
N(t)
µ
c
λω
+
Gω
λω
¶
dω = N(t)[Γc + Ω]. (12)
Therefore:
c =
θ0 − Ω
Γ
, (13)
where Γ =
R 1
0
1
λωdω and Ω =
R 1
0
Gω
λω dω. Eq.s (8), (10), and (11) imply that
N(t)
λω
(c + Gω)=bwHXω
ρ + Iω − n
(λω − 1)
,( 1 4 )
which - since wH = σ
θ0−γ and (13) holds - can be rewritten as:
1
λω
µ
θ0 − Ω
Γ
+ Gω
¶
=
bσ
θ0 − γ
xω
ρ + Iω − n
λω − 1
,f o ra l lω ∈ [0,1],( 1 5 )
where xω ≡ Xω
N denotes the population-adjusted degrees of complexity of product ω. Similarly,
the skilled labor market equilibrium implies:
(θ0 +1− 2γ)(1− θ0)φ/2=b
Z 1
0
Iωxωdω.( 1 6 )
In steady state all per-capita variables are constant and therefore
.
X(ω,s)
X(ω,s) = n. Hence (TEG)
implies: I = n/μ. As usual in semi-endogenous growth models with increasing complexity the
steady-state arrival rate of innovation in every industry is a linear increasing function of the
population growth rate. Hence we can rewrite (15) and (16) as follows:
1
λω
µ
θ0 − Ω
Γ
+ Gω
¶
=
bσ
θ0 − γ
xω
ρ + n/μ − n
λω − 1
,f o ra l lω ∈ [0,1],( 1 7 )
12(θ0 +1− 2γ)(1− θ0)φ/2=b
n
μ
Z 1
0
xωdω ≡ b
n
μ
x.( 1 8 )
Proposition 1 If Ω−ΓG
Γ <
(1−2γ)φμσ(ρ+n/μ−n)
2nγ a steady state always exists for every distribution
of λω > 1 and Gω > 0. At each steady state the following properties hold:
a. Gω >G ω
0 implies xω >x ω0 and ∂xω/∂Gω >∂ x ω0/∂Gω0 iﬀ λω >λ ω0
b. θ0 is an increasing function of Ω
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1a suggests that an increase in government spending in sector ω stimulates
innovation in that speciﬁc industry through a market size eﬀect - according to (TEG) the
diﬃculty index xω is proportional to investment in innovation in sector ω. Moreover the propo-
sition shows that 1 dollar of government spending is more eﬀective in stimulating innovation
when directed towards sectors with high quality jumps. The importance of proposition 1b
will become clearer later; for the moment it suﬃces to note that it shows that the share of
unskilled workers θ0 is increasing with the technology-adjusted average government spending
Ω.14
5F i s c a l p o l i c y r u l e s
Here we specify rules for public spending and derive the basic result of the paper. The ﬁscal
policy rule that we use is a linear combination of two extreme rules: a perfectly symmetric rule
in which every sector gets the same share of public spending, that is Gω = G , and a rule that
allocates public spending in proportion to the quality jump in innovation, that is Gω = Gλω
λ .A
linear combination of the two extreme rules yields the general rule Gω =( 1−α)G+αG
¡
λω/λ
¢
,
with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Proposition 2 E v e r ym o v ef r o mas y m m e t r i cr u l et oar u l et h a tm o r eh e a v i l yp r o m o t e ss e c t o r s
with above-average quality-jumps, that is an increase in α, produces a decrease in Ω ,w h i c hi n
turn implies a decrease in the share of the population that decides not to acquire skills θ and an
increase in the skill premium wH.
14The average goverment spending is G =
R 1
0 Gωdω.
13Proof. The general rule yields Ω = G
hR 1
0
1−α
λω dω + α
λ
i
and deriving Ω with respect to α we
obtain ∂Ω/∂α = G
h
−
R 1
0
1
λωdω + 1
λ
i
: Jensen’s inequality implies that ∂Ω/∂α < 0.T h u s ,as h i f t
to more asymmetric spending (an increase in α ) decreases Ω that, according to Proposition
1.a, generates a decrease in the share of the population that decides not to acquire skills, θ0.
Recalling that the skill premium is wH = σ/(θ0 − γ),w ec o n c l u d et h a tah i g h e rα leads to
higher wage inequality.
Proposition 2 contains the basic result of the model: when government switches to a policy
promoting high-tech sectors there is an increase in the relative supply of skilled workers and
an increase in the skill premium.15 This result is directly related to our asymmetric-industry
setting. One dollar of public money in high-tech sectors yields more additional proﬁts than
those lost taking one dollar away from low-tech sectors, and the net result is an increase in
aggregate proﬁts and innovation activity.16 When industries are symmetric the proﬁtr a t ei s
the same in all industries and aggregate proﬁts are not aﬀected by a reshuﬄing of government
spending.
It is worth stressing that the eﬀect of public spending composition on innovation and growth
takes place only along the transition to the steady state. We work with a semi-endogenous
framework where long-run growth is pinned down by the growth rate of population (I = n/μ).
Although steady state growth rates are not aﬀected, policies altering the scale innovation will
have a permanent impact on the levels. Hence, the steady state relative labor demand and
supply will change according to our ﬁndings in proposition 2.
6 Quantitative analysis
Regression results in section 2 suggest that the model identiﬁes an important link. In this
section we try to measure the quantitative relevance of our mechanism by calibrating a two-
sector version of the model.17 Since the only available data on public spending composition
concern investment, in the calibration exercise we need to reinterpret the model in terms of
intermediate goods. As is common in the literature an alternative interpretation of quality-
ladder models is one where households consume a homogeneous consumption good which is
15This theoretical result matches two well known stylized facts of the U.S. labor market (see Acemoglu 2002a
ﬁgure 1).
16From (9) we know that λω coincides with the markup over the unit cost for the sector ω. It follows that
markups are higher in high-tech sectors.
17All the results obtained for the model with a continuum of sectors hold for this simpliﬁed version.
14assembled from diﬀerentiated intermediate goods. The static utility function in (1) can be then
interpreted as a CRS production function where superior quality intermediate goods are more
productive in manufacturing the ﬁnal good.18
The exercise consists of choosing the 8 parameters of the model {D,Tr,ρ,γ,n,μ,λ 1,λ 2} to
match salient long-run features of the U.S. economy. Since we work with intermediate goods,
we need to choose our unit of time to be large enough to match their average life time. For
t h i sp u r p o s ew ec h o o s eﬁve years as our unit of time.19 After calibrating the model we explore
the eﬀects of government policy on the skill premium between two 5-years periods, 1976-80 and
1987-91.20 We compute the increase in the skill premium produced by shocking the model with
the change in the composition of public spending showed in ﬁgure 1, and compare it with the
actual increase observed in the data.
The calibration of some parameters is standard. We set ρ, which in the steady state is equal
to the interest rate r,t o0.07 to match the average real return on the stock market of 7 percent
for the past century, estimated in Mehra and Prescott (1985).21 We calibrate n to match a
population growth rate of 1.14%, as in Jones and Williams (2000). Since our time unit is 5
years, both ρ and n must be multiplied by ﬁve, as we do in table II below. We choose the total
working life time D =4 0as in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) and the total training time
Tr=5to match the average years of college in the US - both values must be adjusted for our
time unit in table II.22 We choose the threshold γ to bound the relative supply of unskilled
workers above 75 percent of the workforce, as in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999).
The crucial parameters of the calibration are the R&D diﬃculty index μ, and the quality
jumps of the low and high-tech sectors, λ1 and λ2 respectively. We calibrate the quality jumps
using estimates of the sectorial markups for 2-digit U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms. We use the
18See Grossman and Helpman (1991) ch. 4.
19Since there is no capital in the model we consider intermediate goods as fully depreciating every period.
Average full depreciation period of intermediate goods is 8-10 years. We choose the lenght of a period to be
not greater of the average training time, which we reasonably assume to be 5 years.
20We choose 1976-80 as the starting year because it corresponds to the moment when the composition of
public spending starts moving faster towards high-tech goods, and it is also very close to the turning point of
the dynamics of the skill premium. We limit the analysis to the period 1976-91 because these are the years
where the bulk of the increase in the U.S. skill premium took place (see ﬁgure 1).
21Jones and Williams (2000) suggest that the interest rate in R&D-driven growth models is also the equilibrium
rate of return to R&D, and so it cannot be simply calibrated to the risk-free rate on treasury bills - which is
around 1%. They in fact calibrate their R&D-driven growth model with interest rates ranging from 0.04 to
0.14.
22Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) use a training time of four years, we stretch it to ﬁve to match our time
unit of ﬁve years.
15revised OECD classiﬁcation of high-tech and low-tech sectors as in Hatzichronoglu (1997)23.
Roeger (1995) estimates sectorial markups for the period 1953-84, we take the lower bound of
both high-tech and low-tech groups in these estimates, that is, we consider a 15 percent and a
34 percent markup for low and high-tech respectively24. In our 5-year time frame this implies
setting λ1 =( 1+0 .15 ∗ 5) = 1.75 and λ2 =1+0 .34 ∗ 5=2 .7.
Once we have calibrated the two quality jumps we can use the equation for the growth rate
to obtain the diﬃculty index parameter μ:
g =
.
u
u
= I
Z 1
0
logλωdω =
n
μ
1
2
(lnλ1 +l nλ2).( 1 9 )
From the Penn World tables we take an average GDP growth rate for the period 1976-1991 in
the U.S. of 2.3 percent and using the quality jumps, calibrated as explained above, we obtain
μ equals to 0.47, which is the parameter of the R&D diﬃculty index25.
To account for the real weight of public investment expenditure on the overall economy we
introduce government investment as a share of total private investment.26 Therefore we set
βω = Gω
c and the demand in (8) becomes
cN(t)
λω
+
N(t)βωc
λω
=
N(t)c
λω
(1 + βω)=qω.
Working out the equilibrium with this modiﬁcation, reducing the system to one equation - as
23In our high-tech group we include sectors classiﬁed as high-tech and medium high-tech in Hatzichronoglu
(1997), and similarly we contruct our low-tech group. We are aware of using diﬀerent sector classiﬁcations for
markups and for public investment. This is due to lack of estimates of markups for E&S and strucutures, and
to lack of data on goverment procurement by industry. This simpliﬁcation does not seem to be problematic
because calibrating the markups using diﬀerent growth rates for E&S and structures we would obtain a similar
picture. In fact, calibrating μ externally we could use two separate growth equations, g1 =( n/μ)lnλ1 and
g2 =( n/μ)lnλ2, and estimates of the growth rates in E&S and structure to calibrate λ1 and λ2. Cummins
and Violante (2002) ﬁnd that average technical change in E&S in the last 30 years in the U.S. to be between 5
and 6 percent. Gort, Greenwood and Rupert (1999) ﬁnd a 1 percent yearly average structures-speciﬁc technical
change in the last three decades.
24We take the lower bounds of Roeger’s estimates because we want to provide a baseline calibration with
reasonable markup levels. Too high markup levels would inﬂate incentives to innovate in the model and lead to
an overstatement of the results. We also performed the calibration with the average markups in Roegers (1995)
weighted with the sectoral output share. This leads to an average markup of 45 percent and in low-tech and of
70 percent in high-tech sectors. In the comparative static exercise we obtain results similar to those reported
below.
25We use equal weights for the two sectors for simplicity. We have also performed the exercise using some
measure of the weights of the high-tech and low-tech sectors in the real economy and we get similar results.
Using sectoral output shares, for instance, we obtain a 51 percent high-tech share and a 49 percent low-tech
share.
26Private spending in the model, labeled c, is consumption. In the calibration, since we work with investment
data, private spending is private investment.
16we did in (A.1.1) - and substituting wH = σ
θ0−γ into it we obtain a relation between the skill
premium and the composition of public spending (share of low-tech goods
G1
c and share of
high-tech goods
G2
c ):
µ
σ
wH
+1− γ
¶µ
1 −
σ
wH
+ γ
¶
φ/2=
n( σ
wH )
μσ(ρ + n/μ − n)
µ σ
wH +1
Γ + Ψ
¶¡
1 − Γ + β − Ψ
¢
, (20)
where β =
R 1
0 βωdω =0 .5 ∗ G1
c +0 .5 ∗ G2
c and Ψ =
R 1
0
βω
λωdω =0 .5 ∗ G1
λ1c +0 .5 ∗ G2
λ2c.T a b l e I V
below summarizes our calibration.
TABLE IV
Summary of calibration
parameter value moment to match source
D 8 life time after college Dinopoulos-Segerstrom 1999
T 1 years of college Dinopoulos-Segerstrom 1999
ρ 0.15 interest rate Jones and Williams (2000)
n 0.07 population growth rate Jones and Williams (2000)
γ 0.75 lower-bound for the share of unskilled Dinopoulos-Segerstrom 1999
μ 0.47 GDP growth rate of 2.3% Penn World Tables
λ1 1.75 low-tech markup of 15% Roeger (1995)
λ2 2.7 high-tech markup of 34% Roeger (1995)
To asses the eﬀect of public spending on wages we use BEA NIPA data on government
investment in structure (G1), our low-tech aggregate, and E&S (G2), our high-tech aggregate.27
NIPA data on public expenditure shows the following composition in the two periods of interest:
in 1976-80 average government investment in structure was 29 percent and in E&S was 7 percent
of total private investment (
G1
c =0 .29 and
G2
c =0 .07); respectively, in 1987-91 the low-tech
expenditure share decreased to 26 percent and the high-tech share rose to 18 percent. In
our calibrated model this change in the composition of public spending in favor of high-tech
sectors produces a 2.1 percent increase in the skill premium. For the observed skill premium
we use CPS data from Krusell et al. (2000) on average wages of college graduates and high-
school graduates. In the period considered this measure of the skill premium increased by 17.8
27Notice that here we do not exactly use the ﬁscal policy rules speciﬁed in section 5. This is because when
in this simpliﬁed version of the model those rules would not allow us to catch the entire eﬀect of a change in
the composition of public spending on the skill premium. In fact, in the case of extreme asymmetric spending
(α =1 ) our rule predicts that the low-tech sector gets a share of the public spending that is proportional to it’s
quality jump. While, in the data the extreme asymmetry would mean that the spending going to the low-tech
sector would be zero (G1 =0 ). Thus, to keep the model closer to the data in the quantitative excercise we
use directly government investment in the two sectors, as a share of total private investment, as an index of
spending composition.
17percent. Hence, our demand composition shock can explain 12 percent of the total increase in
the skill premium shown in the data.28
We also explore the sensitivity of the results to changes in the diﬀerence in the sectorial
quality jumps, which is a proxy of the ‘technology gap’ between the two sets of industries. We
leave λ1 unchanged and increase λ2 t om a t c ha na v e r a g ew e i g h t e dm a r k u po f79 percent - the
weights are sectorial output shares. These changes increase the percentage of the observed skill
premium explained by the model from 12 to 24 percent. Hence, the quantitative importance
of our mechanism increases with the technology gap between low and high-tech sectors.29
7D i s c u s s i o n
In this section we provide a discussion on the predictions of the model and on the quantitative
results obtained.
Within and between-industry changes. In our model the demand-composition shock
produces skill-upgrading in high-tech sectors and de-skilling in low-tech sectors. Recent empir-
ical works have showed that skill-upgrading and increasing wage inequality took place in both
high-tech and low-tech sectors in the period of interest, with higher intensity in the former
group of industries (see i.e. Machin and Van Reenen,1998). Our results cannot fully match
this empirical evidence. Here two remarks are needed: ﬁrst, we do not claim that our source of
innovation is the only one that might have played a role in explaining the observed dynamics
of technical change and wage inequality. Second, even restricting the focus on the ‘policy chan-
nel’ our analysis is limited to a single, demand-side, policy tool. It is likely that supply-side
innovation policies, such as R&D subsidies and technology transfer, might also have aﬀected
technology and wages in recent years. For instance, the introduction in 1981 of R&D subsidies
through the Research and Experimentation (R&E) Tax Credit, by reducing the after-tax cost
28The measure of inequality that we use, wH/wL, might overstate the increase in the skill premium when
we bring the model to the data. This happens because the average wage of skilled workers in the model is R 1
θ0(θ − γ)wHdF (θ) which is smaller than wH.W ed on o tu s et h i sm e a s u r ei nt h ec a l i b r a t i o nb e c a u s et h e r ei s
as e m p l i ﬁcation in the model that counterbalances the overstatement of the skill premium generated by using
wH as average skilled wages. In fact we assumed that unskilled workers do not accumulate human capital,
and so their average wage is simply wL. In the data average wages of both skilled and unskilled are computed
taking into account the ‘abilities’, or human capital, of heterogeneous workers in the two groups. Hence, using
wL in the model for the average unskilled wage understates the real measure of the skill premium. Our take is
to leave human capital accumulation out of the measure of inequality in the calibration to avoid distortions in
both directions.
29It is worth to notice that the substantial but relatively small amount of inequality explained by our mechanim
might be biased downward by the lack of data on the technological composition of public consumption.
18of innovation might have increased the relative demand for skills and the skill premium in all
sectors of the economy. Introducing R&D subsidies in the model would allow us to have a policy
tool that produces skill-upgrading in all industries symmetrically. The extent to which R&D
subsidies would compensate for the negative skill-upgrading in low-tech industries produced
by government expenditures will depend on the parameters of the model and on the relative
strength of the two types of policies.
In appendix B we have extended the model to include a simple symmetric subsidy to R&D.30
We have used Hall (1993) estimates of the eﬀective credit rate produced by the R&E Tax
Credit, and measured the eﬀects of R&D subsidies on wage inequality. The annual across-
sectors average credit rate varies between 3.04 percent in 1981 and 7.49 percent in 1991.31 In
our starting period, 1976-80 the credit is 0, and in the ending period, 1987-91, the average credit
rate is estimated to be around 4 percent per year. In our calibrated model this subsidy shock
produces a 3.2 percent increase in the skill premium, accounting for about 18 percent of the real
change in the skill premium over the period. Hence, when we introduce a supply-side policy
tool, the model could predict skill-upgrading and increasing wage inequality in both high-tech
and low-tech sectors, with higher intensity in the former group of industries, in accordance with
the evidence in Machin and Van Reenen (1998).
Moreover, there is consensus in the literature that most of the recent increase in wage
inequality is explained by within-industry changes and that between-industry changes play a
minor but non-negligible role. Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), for instance, ﬁnd that
between-industry changes explain about one-third of the total increase in the share of the wage
bill of non-production workers in the period 1979-87. They also ﬁnd that the primary source of
inequality induced by between-industry changes was explained by defense procurement.32 Our
ﬁndings are not far from this general picture.
Finally, the recent empirical literature on sector-speciﬁc technical change conﬁrms the idea
that high-tech sectors have been the major engine of innovation in the last decades.33 Cummins
30Appendix B is available upon request.
31The credit rate was initially set at 25 percent of “incremental” R&D: incremental meant above the level of
the previous year in 1981, and in the following years the increase was measured over the average R&D spending
in the previous three years. The credit rate was also reduced to 20 per cent from 1982 onward. Although the
credit rate has been fairly constant, its incremental feature generates a persistent incentive for private ﬁrms to
increase their R&D investment over time.
32They rely on evidence that defense related industries tend to employ a large proportion of non production
workers, especially with the emphasis put on high-tech weapons since the late 1970s (see also O’Hanlon, 2000).
33See Hornstein et al. (2005).
19and Violante (2002) ﬁnd the average technical change in E&S over the last 30 years in the
U.S. to be between 5 and 6 percent. In this literature, the change in E&S is proxied by the
diﬀerence in growth rates between constant-quality consumption prices and quality-adjusted
prices of investment in E&S. The substantial decline of the quality-adjusted price of capital
equipment since the early 1970s provides evidence of E&S-speciﬁc technical change. Recently
some empirical works have shown that, although technical change in structures is less relevant
than in equipment goods, it has been positive and signiﬁcative in the last decades. Gort,
Greenwood and Rupert (1999) ﬁnd a 1 percent yearly average structures-speciﬁct e c h n i c a l
change during the last three decades. In line with this evidence, the demand-pull eﬀect of
public spending composition reduces the quality-adjusted prices of high-tech goods more than
those of low-tech goods.
Autonomous private innovation. We want to emphasize that our analysis is not meant
to exclude or downplay any autonomous role of private innovation. Indeed, one could introduce
asymmetry in private spending and study the eﬀects of changes in its composition on the wage
structure. According to the facts discussed in section 2 we expect that the shift in public
spending composition will be relatively more important in the 1980s, and private spending
composition will be the main factor in the 1990s.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have shown that the technological content of government procurement played
as i g n i ﬁcant role in explaining the wave of innovations that hit the U.S. economy in recent
decades and its eﬀects on the wage structure. The interaction between policy and the het-
erogeneous industry structure yields the basic theoretical contribution of the paper: a shift
in the composition of public spending towards highly innovative sectors increases aggregate
expenditure in innovation and the skill premium.
We identify and quantify the role of a new source of technical change, government policy,
which complements the role of international trade (Dinopoulos and Segerstrom 1999 and Ace-
moglu 2003) and of the relative supply of skills (Acemoglu 1998 and 2002b, and Kiley 1998).
It is worth stressing once again that our model is not, strictly speaking, a model of skill-biased
technical change. However, introducing endogenous factor-bias in the set-up and assuming that
high-tech goods are produced by skilled workers and low-tech goods by unskilled workers, the
20composition of government spending would have the same qualitative eﬀects on inequality.
This paper represents a ﬁr s ta t t e m p tt oe v a l u a t et h ee ﬀects of policy on technology and
wages and is amenable to many extensions. Further research is needed to ﬁll the data gap that
prevents a more rigorous evaluation of the magnitude of the policy eﬀects on wages. Lacking
data on the technological composition of aggregate government procurement, in our empirical
analyses we have used the only available sub-sample: the composition of government investment.
Despite the support for our theory provided by such data, a larger sample of government
procurement would certainly reﬁne the results. Hence, some eﬀort should be devoted to the
collection of data on the composition of public consumption between high-tech and low-tech
sectors; this would allow for a better quantitative assessment of our demand-side policy channel.
Moreover, it would be interesting to introduce asymmetric private spending and evaluate the
relative importance of public and private spending composition in producing a demand-driven
mechanism of innovation and inequality.
A second line of future research would involve a more complete investigation of the ‘policy
channel’ by explicitly introducing into the model some supply-side policy tools that might have
contributed to increase private incentives to innovate in the 1980s. In this period, in fact,
we observe the introduction of new policy tools aimed at facilitating ﬁrms’ access to public
technology, improve intellectual property rights and, more in generally, reduce the private cost
of innovation. The introduction of the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit in 1981
discussed in the previous section; the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and the Federal Technology
Transfer Act of 1986, which transformed federal laboratories into sources of innovation for U.S.
ﬁrms; the establishment in 1982 of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which improved
the protection granted to patents holders; the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984,
which reduced antitrust prosecution of joint ventures for pre-commercial research. Mowery
(1998) describes this set of policies as a "structural change in the U.S. national innovation
system". There is suﬃcient consensus among technology policy scholars that the post-1980
shift, started during the Reagan and Bush administrations and continued as a trademark of
Clinton’s economic policy, represents a crucial move towards an explicit commercial innovation
policy in the U.S..34
Finally, our basic theoretical ﬁnding highlights a mechanism of ‘zero-cost’ growth policy that
34For a more detailed analysis of the changes in technology policy in the 1980s see Mowery and Rosenberg
(1989), Mowery (1998), and Branscomb and Florida (1998).
21can be relevant for recent policy debates, especially in those countries that, burdened by large
public debt, wish to stimulate growth without using deﬁcit spending. For instance, low-cost
growth policies have recently played a central role in the implementation of the Lisbon Agenda
in the E.U.. (see Sapir 2003).35 In our semi-endogeous set-up reshuﬄing public expenditure in
favor of high-tech sectors promotes higher economic growth along the transition to the steady
state. Introducing the asymmetric industry structure into a fully-endogenous R&D-driven
growth model (i.e. Dinopoulos and Thompson, 1998, Howitt, 1999, Peretto, 1998) the increase
in the technological composition of government spending would increase long-run growth. This
could be another interesting area of future research.
9 Appendix
P r o o fo ft h ee x i s t e n c eo ft h es t e a d ys t a t e .Solving (17) for xω and integrating it w.r.t. ω
we get:
x =
θ0 − γ
bσ(ρ + n/μ − n)
£
(θ0 − Ω)(Γ
−1 − 1) + (G − Ω)
¤
(A1)
and substituting this into (18) we obtain the following synthetic equilibrium condition:
(θ0 +1− 2γ)(1− θ0)φ/2=
n(θ0 − γ)
μσ(ρ + n/μ − n)
£
(θ0 − Ω)(Γ
−1 − 1) + (G − Ω)
¤
. (A.1.1)
The LHS of this eq. (A11) is a strictly concave quadratic polynomial with roots on 2γ − 1
and 1, and the RHS of eq. (A11) is a strictly convex quadratic polynomial with roots γ and
Ω−ΓG
1−Γ . It follows that, if the stated parameter restrictions are satisﬁed, there exists always one
and only one real and positive solution θ0 ∈ (γ,1). The proof follows from the fact that the
speciﬁed parameter restriction allows the intercept (the value of the polynomial at θ0 =0 )
of the LHS polynomial to be bigger than in intercept of the RHS polynomial. Speciﬁcally
LHS(0) >R HS (0) implies:
(1 − 2γ)φ/2 >
nγ
μσ(ρ + n/μ − n)
(
Ω − ΓG
Γ
),
35For a recent survey on growth policies see Aghion and Howitt (2005).
22which rearranged leads to the parameter restriction. It is easy to see that this condition allows
for a unique solution36. Moreover for Minkowski’s inequality Ω − ΓG<0, therefore when
1 − 2γ>0 no restriction on parameters is needed for a unique solution.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . a .Solving (17) for xω we get:
µ
λω − 1
λω
¶µ
θ0 − Ω
Γ
+ Gω
¶
θ0 − γ
bσ(ρ + n/μ − n)
= xω,
and deriving w.r.t. Gωwe obtain
∂xω
∂Gω
=
µ
λω − 1
λω
¶
θ0 − γ
bσ(ρ + n/μ − n)
,
which is always positive since λω > 1, θ0 >γand ρ>n . F r o mt h i sd e r i v a t i v ew ec a na l s o
see that ∂xω/∂Gω >∂ x ω0/∂Gω0 when (λω − 1)/λω > (λω0 − 1)/λω0 which is always true if
λω >λ ω0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . bRearranging (A11) we get a single polynomial in θ0 and Ω:
F (θ0;Ω)=
n(θ0 − γ)
μσ(ρ + n/μ − n)
£
(θ0 − Ω)(Γ
−1 − 1) + (G − Ω)
¤
− (θ0 +1− 2γ)(1− θ0)φ/2.
(A.1.2)
Using the Implicit Function Theorem we get:
dθ0
dΩ
=
−∂F/∂Ω
∂F/∂θ0
=
=
n(θ0−γ)
μσ(ρ+n/μ−n)Γ
n
μσ(ρ+n/μ−n)
£
(θ0 − Ω)(Γ−1 − 1) + (G − Ω)
¤
+
n(θ0−γ)
μσ(ρ+n/μ−n)(Γ−1 − 1) + φ(θ0 − γ)
> 0
This results follows from the fact that θ0 >γ , ρ>n , Γ−1 > 1 and ﬁnally, from (A1) we
know that the expression inside the square brackets is greater than zero.
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26Figure 1. Public spending composition and the skill premium: 1963-99
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Note: public spending composition is government investment in E&S as a share of total government 
investment.  Sources: BEA, NIPA Tables section 5 for investment and  Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and 
Violante (2000) and Current Population Survey (1999) for the skill premium. 
  
Figure 2. Private R&D spending and the skill premium
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Source: NSF, Science and Engineers Indicators 2004 and Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante (2000) 
and Current Population Survey   (1999).  
 